Voluntary Agreements In Environmental Policy
Voluntary approaches to the environment: effectiveness, efficiency and use in policy dosages provide an in-depth assessment of the use of voluntary approaches, based on a series of new case studies and extensive research of available literature. The analysis focuses on both voluntary approaches, which are isolated and used in policy dosages. This document contains taxonomy and models to help integrate the cost-effectiveness of voluntary environmental agreements (AVs) into the typical framework of environmental economics. As resources for voluntary action become increasingly important, a question needs to be asked about the factors that influence the implementation of a voluntary agreement as an environmental policy instrument. Our objective in this paper is to answer this question and outline the key variables that make a voluntary agreement effective, effective and fair. Using several articles on voluntary action under the themes of `economic regulation` and contracts under `asymmetric information`, as well as available reports on the Portuguese and European experience in the use of voluntary agreements, we will pursue this objective after three stages: (i) we begin to highlight the main factors that justify the private and public option of voluntary action. (ii) We will then conduct an analysis of the co-regulation process as part of the requirements of the three electronic criteria: efficiency, efficiency and fairness. iii) Finally, we present an “assessment table” that summarizes the elements we have identified as the most important for the “performance” of voluntary action in each of these criteria. Voluntary approaches to the environment, including negotiated environmental performance agreements with industry and public programs in which companies can voluntarily participate, are becoming increasingly popular in a number of countries. However, the OECD`s work calls into question its impact on the environment and its economic efficiency. Voluntary environmental agreements attempt to address market failures in a different way than traditional regulatory and economic instruments.
They are based on exchanges between the P.A. and companies and on the development of a framework of incentives for the parties in the context of negotiation and cooperation. The efficiency and effectiveness of AVs depend on specific characteristics that can only be assessed by a case analysis. VAs may effectively be included in the environmental politician`s toolkit if certain conditions relating to their design and implementation are met, in order to limit the risk of arrest and freedom of conduct by regulators.